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in games with uncertainties
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January 12, 2013
Abstract
In this short note, we investigate extensions of Nash equilibria when players have
some uncertainties upon their payoffs mappings, the behavior (or the type, number
or any other characteristics) of their opponents. These solutions are qualified either
as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion, depending on
the context. We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees
their existence and we show that this is actually a selection of conjectural (or self-
confirming) equilibria. We finally conclude by how this concept can and should be
defined in games with partial monitoring in order to preserve existence properties.
Introduction
Nash equilibria are "N -tuple of [mixed] strategies, one for each player, [that] may be
regarded as a point in the product space obtained by multiplying the N strategy spaces
of the players" [13], "such that each player’s mixed strategy maximizes his payoff if the
strategies of the others are held fixed. Thus each player’s strategy is optimal against
those of the others" [14]. It is therefore implicitly assumed that each player knows not
only his own payoff mapping, but also his set of opponents and strategies they are going
to play. However, in some cases (which can rely on empirical or intuitive results as
in Ellsberg’s paradox [6]), players do not have perfect knowledge of their own payoff
mapping (or preferences can not be represented by such mappings) or they might have
only partial information upon their opponents or their action set as in games on internet.
Several authors have modeled this and different, yet quite related, notions have
emerged. Among them, we can cite robustness [1] – when payoff mappings are unknown
(the name refers to robust optimization [5]) – or uncertainty aversion [10], ambiguity [3],
partially specified probabilities [11] – when strategies actually played at an equilibrium
is not perfectly known to players (their only knowledge is that they must belong to some
given sets). A common feature of these concepts is that they all rely on maximization
of a criterion with a non-unique prior, following [8]. Another solution is to assume that,
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in presence of uncertainties, players formulate a conjecture upon their opponents, and
then maximize payoffs with respect to this conjecture. This is exactly the basic ideas
behind conjectural and self-confirming equilibria [4, 7, 9].
The main focus of this note is to formalize and unify in a general framework different
notions of Nash equilibria with uncertainties (yet we kept the name of robust Nash
equilibria) and to provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition guaranteeing their
existence. We also show that this is in fact a selection of conjectural equilibria and we
describe how it should be defined in games with partial monitoring [12]. Results are, as
often as possible, based on simple and illustrating examples.
1 Robust Nash equilibria
We consider N -player games where Xn ⊂ R
An , action set of player n ∈ N := {1, . . . , N},
is a compact and convex set and his payoff mapping un : X → R, with X =
∏
m∈N Xm,
is multilinear. In particular un(·, x−n) is linear for every x−n ∈ X−n :=
∏
m6=nXm.
We first recall some basic facts on Nash equilibria. Define, for every n ∈ N , the
best reply correspondence BRn from R
An to Xn by BRn(Un) := argmaxxn∈Xn〈xn, Un〉.
Then x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium iff there exists, for every n ∈ N ,
Un ∈ R
An satisfying x∗n ∈ BRn(Un) and Un = un
(
·, x∗−n
)
. As it is a fixed point of
x⇉
∏
n∈N BRn
(
un(·, x−n)
)
, its existence is ensured by Kakutani’s theorem.
Best replies are extended with uncertainties, following [8], into
BRn : P(R
An)⇉ Xn with BRn(Un) = arg max
xn∈Xn
inf
Un∈Un
〈xn, Un〉 ,
where P(RAn) is the family of subsets ofRAn . This is well-defined since x 7→ infUn∈Un〈x,Un〉
is concave and upper semi-continuous hence maxima are attained.
Remark 1 Evaluation of payoff decreases with respect to uncertainties, represented by
the subset Un. Indeed, if Vn ⊂ Un, then infVn∈Vn〈xn, Vn〉 ≥ infUn∈Un〈xn, Un〉, for every
xn ∈ Xn. This is referred as "uncertainty aversion" of players, see for instance [8]: the
more information a player has, the more he values his payoff.
No assumptions are made on origins or structure of uncertainties; they are repre-
sented, for every n ∈ N , by a given mapping Φn : X−n ⇉ R
An . The usual framework,
called full monitoring case, corresponds to Φn(x−n) =
{
un(·, x−n)
}
.
Definition 1 x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ X is a robust Nash equilibrium iff there exists, for
every n ∈ N , Un ⊂ R
An satisfying x∗n ∈ BRn(Un) and Un = Φn
(
x∗−n
)
.
Existence of Robust Nash equilibria is ensured under a mild regularity assumption.
Proposition 1 If every Φn is continuous, there exist robust Nash equilibria.
2
Proof: Robust Nash equilibria are fixed points of the correspondence defined, for every
x ∈ X , by BR
[
Φ(x)
]
=
∏
n∈N BRn
[
Φn(x−n)
]
, which is always a compact non-empty
convex subset of X . If Φ is continuous then BR
[
Φ(·)
]
has a closed graph, hence by
Kakutani’s theorem, it has fixed points that are Nash equilibria. 2
A key property is that existence of Nash equilibria is not implied only by either upper
nor lower semi-continuity of Φ, as illustrated in the following Example 1.
Example 1 Consider the following bi-matrix game, whose unique Nash equilibrium in
full monitoring is (x∗, y∗) = (1/2T + 1/2B, 2/3L + 1/3R), defined by
L R
T 1;0 0;1
B 0;1 2;0
X1 = ∆({T,B}), X2 = ∆({L,R}), Φ2(x) = {u2(x, ·)},
Φ1(y
∗) = {u1(·, y); y ∈ X2} and Φ1(y) = {u1(·, y)} otherwise.
Φ2 is continuous and Φ1 upper semi-continuous, yet no robust Nash equilibrium exists.
If Φ1 is modified into Φ
′
1(R) = {u1(·, R)} and Φ
′
1(y) = {u1(·, y); y ∈ X2} otherwise,
then Φ′1 is lower semi-continuous and no robust Nash equilibrium exists.
Precedent notions of equilibria corresponds to specific structures of Φn: for instance,
Φn(x−n) = {u(·, x−n);u ∈ U} where U is some given convex family of possible payoff
mappings in [1], or Φn(x−n) = {un(·, q−n); q−n ∈
∏
m6=n Xm[xm]} where Xm[xm] ⊂ Xm
is defined by a small number of linear (in x−m) mappings [11].
2 Selection of conjectural equilibria
Conjectural, self-confirming or subjective equilibria [4, 7, 9] can be related to robust Nash
equilibria. Recall that x∗ ∈ X is a conjectural equilibrium of a game with uncertainties
if, for every n ∈ N , there exists a conjecture V ⋆n , i.e. an element of the convex hull of
Φ(x∗−n), denoted by co
(
Φ(x∗−n)
)
, such that x∗n is a best reply to {V
⋆
n }, see e.g. [2].
Sets of conjectural equilibria can be very large and even equal to X . This is the
case in every game in the dark (without strictly dominated strategies) i.e., as soon
as Φn(·) = {un(·, x−n);x−n ∈ X−n}. On the other hand, in those games, there are
generically only one robust Nash equilibrium: each player plays his maxmin strategy.
Proposition 2 A robust Nash equilibrium is a conjectural equilibrium.
Proof Any robust Nash equilibrium x∗ satisfies, by linearity of 〈x, ·〉,
x∗n ∈ arg max
x∈Xn
min
Un∈Φn(x∗
−n
)
〈x,Un〉 = arg max
x∈Xn
min
Vn∈co(Φn(x∗
−n
))
〈x, Vn〉
So x∗n is an optimal strategy in the zero-sum game with action sets Xn, co
(
Φn(x
∗
−n)
)
and payoff 〈x, Vn〉. It remains to let V
∗
n be any optimal strategy of the second player. 2
Nash equilibria with uncertainties, as defined in [10], is a pair (x∗,U) such that
x∗n ∈ Un and un(·, x
∗
−n) ∈ Un. This is more related to conjectural than to robust equilibria
(except that a conjecture is not some probability upon a set but the whole set).
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3 Equilibria of games with partial monitoring
We consider finite games, where sets of pure and mixed action of player n are respectively
An and Xn = ∆(An), with partial monitoring : players do not observe actions of their
opponents but they receive messages, see [12]. Formally, there exist a convex compact
set of messages H and signaling mappings Hn from A :=
∏
n∈N An into H, extended
multi-linearly to X . Given a ∈ A, player n receives the message Hn(a).
No matter his choice of actions, player n cannot distinguish between x−n and x
′
−n
in X−n that satisfy Hn (a, x−n) = Hn
(
a, x′−n
)
for every a ∈ An. We define the maximal
informative mapping Hn : Xn →H
An by:
∀x−n ∈ X−n, Hn(x−n) =
[
Hn (a, x−n)
]
a∈An
∈ HAn .
These mappings induce naturally the correspondences Φn : X−n ⇉ R
An defined by:
Φn (x−n) :=
{
un(·, x
′
−n) ∈ R
An ; Hn
(
x′−n
)
= Hn (x−n)
}
. (1)
Definition 2 x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of a game with partial monitoring H iff it
is a robust Nash equilibrium, with uncertainties Φn defined by Equation (1).
Hn and un are continuous, so Φ is continuous and Nash equilibria always exist.
Example 2 Consider the game with payoffs given by the left matrix and H = {a, b, c}.
Player 2 has full monitoring, so H2 is not represented, and H1 is the right matrix:
u1;u2 =
L M R
T 2; 0 1; 0 1; 2
B 0; 1 2; 0 2; 2
and H1 =
L M R
T a a b
B c c c
Actions L and M are undistinguishable so, for every λ ∈ [0, 1] and η ∈ [0, λ]:
Φ1
(
λL+ (1− λ)R
)
= Φ1
(
λM + (1− λ)R
)
= Φ1
(
ηL+ (λ− η)M + (1− λ)R
)
=
{
(1 + γ, 2 − 2γ) ; γ ∈ [0, λ]
}
,
where (1 + γ, 2− 2γ) are respective payoffs of T and B for some γ. As a consequence:
BR1
(
Φ1
(
λL+ (1− λ)R
))
=


{2/3T + 1/3B} if λ < 1/3
{B} if λ > 1/3
∆({T,B}) if λ = 1/3
,
and, since R is a strictly dominating strategy, the only Nash equilibrium is (B,R).
One may object that, given x∗ = (x∗n, x
∗
−n), there might exist an ∈ An such that
x∗n[an], the weight put by x
∗
n on an, is zero. So, player n cannot observe Hn(an, x
∗
−n) nor
4
compute Hn(x
∗
n), as in Example 2. So we should consider instead of Φn the following
correspondence Φ̂n : X ⇉ R
An defined by
Φ̂n(x) =
{
un(·, x
′
−n) ∈ R
An ; Hn(an, x
′
−n) = Hn(an, x−n), ∀an ∈ An s.t. xn[an] > 0
}
.
We also recall that, for some ε > 0, x∗ ∈ X is an ε-equilibria if for every n ∈ N
inf
Un∈Un
〈x∗n, Un〉 ≥ sup
xn∈Xn
inf
Un∈Un
〈xn, Un〉 − ε with Un = Φ̂n(x
∗).
Proposition 3 With respect to Φ̂, there exist games that do not have equilibria or such
that any perturbation of equilibria is not an ε-equilibrium
Proof: In Example 2, if (B,R) is played, the only message received is c so Φ̂(B,R) ={
(1 + γ, 2 − 2γ) ; γ ∈ [0, 1]
}
. Its best reply is T ; yet, for every δ ∈ (0, 1], best reply to
Φ̂
(
δT + (1− δ)B,R
)
=
{
(1, 2)
}
is B. So this game has no equilibria.
For the second part of the proposition, consider the following two players game:
(u1, u2) =
L R
T −1; 0 1; 1
B 0; 0 0; 1
and H1 =
L R
T a b
B c c
(B,R) is an equilibrium since Φ̂(B,R) =
{
(λ, 0) ; λ ∈ [−1, 1]
}
. However, for every
δ > 0, Φ̂
(
δT + (1− δ)B,R
)
=
{
(1, 0)
}
, so δT + (1− δ)B is not an ε-equilibrium. 2
Random messages can be embedded into this framework. Assume that there exists
a finite set S and given a ∈ A, player n receives the signal s ∈ S of law sn(a) ∈ ∆(S).
We define H := ∆(S) and Hn(a−n) :=
[
sn(a, a−n)
]
a∈An
. Although Hn(a−n) is a vector
of laws, unbiased estimators can estimate it at an arbitrarily small cost, see e.g. [15].
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